by College of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in [Urbana] .
Written in English
Bibliography: p. 33.
|Statement||Jonathan A.K. Cave, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics|
|Series||BEBR faculty working paper -- no. 825, BEBR faculty working paper -- no. 825.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||33 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||33|
The set paths (S (T)) equals the set of subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths of the supergame. The above result means that any subgame-perfect equilibrium path follows a ‘syntax’, in which for each action profile on the path there is an elementary Cited by: Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This article examines the subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium paths and payoff sets of discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. The main contribution is to provide methods for computing and tools for analyzing the equilibrium paths and payoffs in repeated games. This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths .
Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames, 1: public lotteries / BEBR No. By Jonathan A.K. Cave Get PDF (2 MB). Abstract This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths . Vol Issue 1, ISSN: (Print) OriginalPaper. Computation of the nucleolus of some bilateral market games. P. Legros Pages OriginalPaper. Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames. Dr. J. Cave Pages OriginalPaper. Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames. Dr. J. Cave Pages This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs. We show that the critical discount factor values are not that high in many games and they generally depend on how large the payoff set is compared to the set of.
Discusses the equilibrium in supergames with evaluation relations determined according to overtaking criterion. Differences between the situation of players undertaking to play a single game, and players who know that they will play the same game repeatedly in the future; Influence of the power of the threats on the existence of equilibrium points. This paper examines the subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames. We present a method that finds all the equilibrium payoffs. Then, the folk theorem guarantees that it is possible to approach u in equilibrium to any desired precision (for every ε there exists a Nash equilibrium where the payoff profile is a distance ε away from u). Subgame perfection. Attaining a subgame perfect equilibrium in discounted games is more difficult than in undiscounted games. The cost. In game theory, a subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games.A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this means that if the players played any smaller game that consisted of only one part of the larger game, their.